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Research Paper
Purpose:
This study tests three theories of determinants of workers’ subjective response to work situations
– structural factors (measured by individual, organization and job characteristics), general
disposition, or informal work arrangements as constructed by Laubach’s (2005) “consent deal.”
Design/methodology/approach:
Data were obtained from the Indiana Quality of Employment Survey, a survey of workers
covering general working conditions. We constructed 10 models regressing worker perceptions
and attitudes (e.g. satisfaction, relations with supervisors, meaningfulness) on structural
determinants. We then used structural equation modeling to identify an underlying factor
representing a general worker response from elements of the attitudes and perceptions. Finally,
we regressed a scalar version of the general response factor on the structural determinants using
the previous models.
Findings: We identified a single second order latent factor underlying the 10 attitudes and
perceptions which represented the “general subjective response” of workers. This supported the
concept of a dispositional effect. We then found that structural factors had a minimal effect on
the subjective response, but that informal arrangements had a very strong effect. This
undermined the first two theories and supported the third.
Implications: Worker attitudes and perceptions are very resilient to different formal work
arrangements but are highly influenced by the informal arrangements negotiated between
workers and front-line management. Organizations can have the strongest effect on developing
worker support by empowering front-line managers to make informal deals on workplace rules.
Originality/value: This study offers a means to probe the relationship between formal and
structural and the informal and subjective worlds of the workplace.
Key words: workplace consent, worker subjectivity, formal structure, informal structure,
structural equation models, second order latent factor.
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INTRODUCTION
Consent is a recurring, but understudied, concept in the sociological literature on the
workplace. In this chapter, we trace the intellectual history of worker consent as emanating from
the informal organization of work and demonstrate how it affects the subjective experience of the
worker. We argue that the “consent deal” results from tacit, ongoing negotiations between
managers and workers in which managers exchange autonomy, schedule flexibility, and voice in
decision-making in return for organizational commitment from workers. This consent deal
results in a tripartite stratification of the workplace into (a) the “administrative clan”—a network
of workers that cuts across hierarchical strata that is managed by normative control and who
display high commitment; (b) the “conventional core”—the majority of workers who are
managed by bureaucratic control and offer moderate commitment; and (c) the “extended
periphery”—workers who are managed by strict personal or technical control and who return
minimal commitment.
The administrative clan is a privileged social network that can be identified in almost
every work site of sufficient size whose members effectively run the organization. Members of
this network are characterized as having high levels of autonomy, flexibility, voice, and
commitment despite having sometimes quite different formal job responsibilities and positions in
the formal authority structure. Previous research has demonstrated that informal organization as
measured by the consent deal has a significant positive effect on objective work outcomes like
wages (Laubach 2005). In this chapter, we examine how consent structures the subjective
rewards of the worker. Our findings suggest that the consent is a key factor in shaping workers’
subjective experience—advantaging some workers and disadvantaging others—net of other
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structural variables. We conclude by discussing the implications of our study for future research
on the workplace.
THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE CONSENT DEAL
Ever since Mayo’s (1933) famous aphorism that “a happy worker is a productive
worker,” organizational behaviorists have been motivated to learn more about workers’
subjective experience of the workplace. Departing from Taylor’s (1911) scientific management
approach that prevailed in earlier decades, Mayo’s human relations movement sought to design
the workplace in ways that enhanced workers’ job satisfaction in hopes that workers who felt
they were performing meaningful, enjoyable, and important jobs would work more efficiently
and profitably. At its core, Mayo’s approach centered on manipulating the structural and physical
conditions of work, but stopped short of granting workers genuine voice or participation in the
work process, believing that to be the exclusive prerogative of management. Mayo’s interest in
job satisfaction spawned a growth industry of research on diverse aspects of workers’ subjective
experience, including organizational commitment (e.g., Mowday et al.1982; Lincoln and
Kalleberg 1990; Mathieu and Zajac 1990), organizational equity and justice (e.g., Leventhal
1980; Organ 1990; Greenberg 1990), and eventually a conception of organizations as systems of
exchange, norms, and shared meanings constructed by management (see Pfeffer 1981). Within
business management circles, this research motivated various initiatives designed to improve
productivity such as “job enrichment,” “worker participation,” “supportive leadership,” and
“pursuit of excellence” – most of which met with similarly dubious results (see Hackman and
Lawler 1971; Staw 1986).
Mayo’s legacy continues today with research into such diverse areas as negative
affectivity (Barsky et al 2004), psychological ownership (Van Dyne and Pierce 2004), workplace
3
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empowerment (Laschinger et al 2004), and expectations of organizational mobility (Pearce and
Randel 2004) – all reflecting Mayo’s central assumption that management can improve
productivity by tweaking the formal arrangements of work and making workers happier.
An opposing viewpoint argues that workers’ subjective perceptions cannot be so easily
manipulated by management to influence productivity (Staw and Ross 1985; Staw 1986; Staw
and Cohen-Charash 2005). This approach argues that workers exhibit a constellation of
workplace attitudes that are highly correlated with each other, but that these attitudes are
dispositional rather than situational. In other words, workers are predisposed to be satisfied or
dissatisfied, fulfilled or alienated, committed or uncommitted, and there is little managers can do
to alter this fundamental disposition or personality trait. These theorists argue that such attitude
sets display long-term stability in workers over time and across different jobs, which suggests
that management interventions are unlikely to improve workers’ job satisfaction. Staw (1986:44)
frames this argument around advice given by a friend to his children: “their most important
decision in life would be whether they wanted to be happy or not; everything else is malleable
enough to fit the answer to this question.”
Proponents of this dispositional approach might agree with Mayo that a happy worker is a
productive worker, but they would disagree with the organizational behaviorists that
management can manipulate organizational structures to improve workers’ job satisfaction. The
best managers can hope for, according to the dispositional theorists, is to use psychological tests
to weed out those workers predisposed not to be happy (Staw and Ross 1985). In fact, the
practice of pre-employment personality screening has “skyrocketed” over the last several years
(Pepper et al. 2005). While much of this discussion has focused on the effects on job satisfaction,
there is a clear assumption that job satisfaction is at the center of a wider constellation of
4
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perceptions and attitudes that constitute worker dispositions. Further, such dispositions dominate
workers’ generalized subjective response to the workplace. 2
A third perspective on workers’ subjective states eventually evolved into the informal
organization approach. This perspective started with Barnard’s (1938) observations describing
the informal organization of work as rooted in workers’ “willingness to cooperate” and
Roethlisberger and Dickson’s (1939 [1967]) work linking worker “sentiments,” independent of
management interventions, to variations in productivity at the Hawthorne plant. Some
proponents of this approach tried to steer research in the informal organization tradition into a
direction that Mayo might have endorsed. For instance, Ouchi and Wilkens (1985:464) believed
that the goal was “to find that large, complex organizations can be made orderly, responsive to
top management, and ‘rational’ in serving the purposes of their owners.” Similarly, Graham and
Organ (1993:494) focused on conditions giving rise to “clan” or “covenantal” organizational
forms that would elicit from workers “any form of contribution, any reasonable exertion of
effort, and any tolerable sacrifice.” This alignment of worker motivations with management
interests, constructed within a spirit of cooperation, efficaciously supplied “an appropriate rule to
govern any possible decision, thus producing a very elegant and complete form of control”
(Ouchi 1980:139). From this logic, Kunda (1992:11) derived his labor control theory that

2

Detractors of this perspective (see Gerhart 2005) point to the checkered history of

personality tests in job selection. They further note that the personality literature has found that
processes involved in keeping attitudes stable (disposition) and changing attitudes are often
“orthogonal,” suggesting that interventions in the workplace could be successful.
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centered on “normative control,” through which workers “are driven by internal commitment,
strong identification with company goals, intrinsic satisfaction from work.”
But other expressions of the informal organization perspective argued that worker
subjectivity is dependent on deeper processes that lie beneath the formal and rational structures
of organizations that management controls. This tradition focuses on worker consent as the
dominant factor influencing workers’ subjective experience in the workplace. 3 This variant of
informal organization theory draws on early findings from researchers like Gouldner (1954:221)
who noted that an important component of consent was the perception by workers that they had
“some measure of control over the initiation and administration of the rules.” Gouldner
(1954:173) surmised that this “measure of control” was rooted in an informal arrangement with
supervisors, and that workers recognized that “formal rules gave supervisors something with
which they could ‘bargain’ in order to secure informal cooperation from workers.”
In a variation of this perspective, Burawoy (1979:xii) acknowledged management’s
coercive power in the capitalist enterprise, but asserted nonetheless that the smooth and efficient
production desired by management required of workers “an element of spontaneous consent.” In
Manufacturing Consent, he focused on the machine shop game of “making out” in which
workers produced above quota levels to earn incentive pay and banked extra production into a
kitty from which they would draw when their production lagged below quota levels. As a worker
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While these and other ethnographic accounts view consent as the central dynamic of the

workplace, it should be remembered that this is but one aspect of informal organization of the
workplace. One goal of a broader research agenda is to examine the interplay among these
multiple features of informal organization and identify their separate influences on subjective
experiences and material outcomes of workers.
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in the machine shop, Burawoy found that proficiency in playing the game provided a basis for
informal status among workers and served as a distraction from the routine and monotony of the
job. However, Burawoy argued that by playing the game, workers were actively engaged in their
own exploitation because consenting to the informal rules of the game amounted to acquiescing
to the capitalist relations of production.
Burawoy further noted that the informal rules under which the game was constituted
directly violated the formal procedures of the workplace and that upper management consistently
admonished supervisors to prevent the banking of surplus production. But supervisors routinely
ignored upper management’s directives, believing that strict enforcement of formal rules would
create tensions on the shop floor that would undermine the smoothness of the production
process. As in Gouldner’s (1954) study, Burawoy found that supervisors quietly acquiesced to
the suspension of formal work rules in an effort to maintain acceptable levels of production.
Ultimately, Burawoy contends that the game of making out pervades the entire process of
production and creates the illusion that workers have real choices in their day-to-day activities
under capitalism: “It is participation in choosing that generates consent” (Burawoy 1979:27).
This apparent disconnect between formal work rules and the informal arrangements
which constitute the lifeblood of the workplace became the central point of Littler and Salaman’s
(1984) analysis of consent. They argue that “the subjectivity of the employee is – and must be –
an inevitable ingredient in the organization of work, the achievement of production at work, in
relations between managers and workers” (Littler and Salaman 1984:54). They echoed Barnard’s
point that formal structures cannot organize all of the necessary effort or realistically address all
circumstances that might arise in production. Rather, the routinization of production requires
some amount of give and take such as bending the rules to achieve extra effort. Workers
7
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sometimes exploit this disconnect between formal and informal organization in a form of
resistance called “working to rule” (see, for example, Garson 1988:102-103) in which they
refuse to participate in this give and take, thereby disrupting production. Littler and Salaman
characterize real work activities as the result of continual negotiations between workers and their
supervisors over interpretations of formal work rules. When successful, this negotiation results in
an exchange in which employers provide a flexible, humane work environment for workers in
return for the work effort to achieve necessary levels of production (see also Baldamus 1961, for
a discussion of the “effort bargain”). Ultimately, they conceptualize consent as the exchange of
relaxed enforcement of formal work rules for alignment of workers’ motivations with the
interests of management.
Laubach (2005) built on Littler and Salaman’s conception by defining consent in terms of
an informal exchange. His ethnography of office workers suggested that the “the consent deal”
consists of an informally negotiated exchange of autonomy, schedule flexibility, and voice in
decision-making by managers for organizational commitment by workers. He noted that while
the first three are generally conceived as objective, structural aspects of a worker’s position,
when measured as self-reports in surveys of workers’ perceptions they evoke a subjective
component that reflects the outcome of informal negotiations between workers and front-line
managers. Thus, in surveys a secretary might express similar levels of autonomy as a middle
manager, and two secretaries in similar formal positions might express vastly different levels of
voice in decision-making. Laubach argued that while survey researchers might treat such
discordant responses as “white noise,” in fact they might accurately convey genuine, deeper
arrangements in the work culture. Laubach saw these informal arrangements as tacit, not
articulated; that is, workers and managers did not formally negotiate bending the rules in
8

CONSENT AND THE SUBJECTIVE WORLD OF THE WORKER
exchange for greater worker effort for to do so would breach formal legitimacy of their
respective roles. Indeed, both workers and managers exerted more power when the arrangement
was unspoken and subject to subtle recalibrations as circumstances change.
In essence, these arrangements constitute informal networks in the workplace that cut
across the formal hierarchy and actually routinize and regulate the inherently conflictual nature
of worker-manager relations. Laubach observed these negotiations result in managers informally
applying different forms of control to workers at the same level within the same unit – similar to
the “cadre” and “hired hand” continuum discussed in leader-member exchange literature (see
Graen and Schiemann 1978; Lagace 1990). He found that this led to an informal structuring of
the workforce – a tripartite stratification into what he called (a) the “administrative clan” – a
network of workers that cut across function and hierarchical strata who exercised high levels of
autonomy, flexibility and participation and were managed using normative control, (b) the
“conventional core” – the majority of workers managed by bureaucratic control and offering
moderate commitment, and (c) the “extended periphery” – workers laboring under the strictest
personal or technical control and who return minimal commitment. Laubach’s ethnographic
observations indicated that this informal stratification translated into very real differences in
status and power, and that it could be operationalized using the consent deal.
Laubach conceptualized the administrative clan as a privileged social network that
extended beyond professional and managerial ranks which was present in one form or another in
almost every work site he had either studied or participated in as a manager. Moreover, workers
in almost every work setting intuitively recognize this network and can identify “insiders” and
“outsiders” in their own workplaces. Members of this network are distinguishable by having high
levels of all four of the consent deal characteristics—despite having sometimes quite different
9
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job responsibilities and positions in the formal authority structure. The inclusion in the clan of
members in lower formal positions—and the occasional exclusion of some members with high
formal authority—argued that there was something going on beyond the conventionally
understood relationship of structurally determined autonomy-producing commitment—i.e.,
something was producing both autonomy and commitment in structural positions where they
would not be expected. This was especially evident when two clerical workers at the same
formal structural level with the same formal job descriptions actually had very different
responsibilities and would be treated very differently by coworkers, professionals, and managers.
Furthermore, this differential treatment was for the most part accepted as legitimate by other
workers and even something to be “earned.”
Laubach concluded that that “something” that was producing both autonomy and
commitment was the “consent deal,” a tacit, informal understanding that the worker will give
more if management bends certain work rules, specifically autonomy, scheduling, and
participation. This tacit bending of the rules, negotiated on an ongoing basis between supervisors
and workers, supersedes the formal structural characteristics of the job, and when measured by
self-reports is often seen as statistical noise. Laubach’s argument thus flies in the face of
conventional wisdom that structurally-induced autonomy, schedule flexibility, and voice in
decision-making create commitment. Rather, he claims that autonomy, commitment, flexibility,
and voice are all simultaneously created by the consent deal. 4

4

To further explicate this point, a manager whose director is replaced by someone who wants

to bring in his or her own managerial staff will find quickly that formal structural position is no
guarantor of autonomy, voice, and even schedule flexibility. Even in managerial and professional
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Laubach’s operationalization of the consent deal is thus a repackaging of familiar
workplace elements that appear in studies of both formal (e.g. Edwards 1979; Ouchi 1980;
Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990; Graham and Organ 1993) and informal (e.g. Gouldner 1954;
Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) workplace stratification systems. Hodson’s (2001) Dignity at Work
reflects a similar orientation (see also Hodson 1996; Hodson and Roscigno 2004) and is of
special interest to our study for several reasons. First, his analysis attempts to unify the
experience of work under the overarching concept of worker dignity, an ambitious task to be
sure, but one worthy of undertaking if we are to understand the complexities of the
intersubjective world of work. Second, much of Hodson’s discussion straddles the boundary
between formal and informal aspects of the workplace and emphasizes the negotiated and
contingent character of workplace outcomes. His approach emphasizes worker agency or “the
active and creative performance of assigned roles in ways that give meaning and content to those
roles beyond what is institutionally scripted” (Hodson 2001:16). Third, while the notion of
consent is “buried” in Hodson’s work, it is present nonetheless. His conceptualization of
“citizenship behaviors” (see also Organ 1988) and “worker resistance” (Jermier, Knights and
Nord 1995; Edwards and Scullion 1982) represent opposite poles on a continuum of worker
consent (see Hodson 1999). For instance, Hodson’s discussion of worker resistance centers on
the “effort bargain” in which workers engage in a variety of behaviors to withhold cooperation
from management (Hodson 2001:42, 62; see also Baldamus 1961; Edwards and Scullion

positions, the level of components of the consent deal is more the outcome of ongoing
supervisor-supervisee negotiation than formal position – even though the negotiations are
expected to start with high levels.
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1982:154). Finally, while Hodson acknowledges the importance of autonomy, participation,
schedule flexibility, and organizational commitment 5 in various places in his theory of worker
dignity, he does not conceptualize them, as we do, as components of the “consent deal” which
we contend is the foundation for understanding the subjective world of the worker as well as the
informal stratification of the workplace.
In this study, we follow Laubach’s (2005) conceptualization of the consent deal as based
on the informal exchange by employers of perceived autonomy, participation, and schedule
flexibility, in return for organizational commitment (or “loyalty”) by workers. This
conceptualization permits that autonomy, participation, and schedule flexibility measured as
perceptions by workers can diverge from the same characteristics measured as structural
elements of the position. Using statistical models of workers’ responses to a general survey of
the workplace, we test the utility of the consent deal as an explanation for a range of subjective
experiences of workers.
This analysis is conducted in two stages. In the first, we develop ten measures that tap
diverse dimensions of workers’ subjective experience. Then, controlling for variables tapping
individual characteristics and structural and organizational features of the workplace, we

5

Hodson (1991) argues that autonomy (pp. 10-13) and participation (pp. 13-16) are key

elements that are present in workplaces that support worker dignity. Schedule flexibility is
related to overwork and excessive hours (pp. 75-76), which is viewed as an obstacle to dignity.
And various aspects of organizational commitment such as commitment to organizational goals,
pride in work, and extra effort (pp. 45-46) are cited as examples of worker citizenship behaviors
that foster cohesion in the workplace and heightened productivity.
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investigate how the consent deal, using Laubach’s (2005) operationalization, impacts each of
these subjective variables. If informal organization theory is supported, consent will have a
strong positive effect on such outcomes as workers’ perceptions of meaningful work, satisfaction
with job security and technology, relations with supervisors and co-workers, and promotion and
pay equity. It should have negative consequences on perceived discrimination, job stress, and
self-estrangement. Moreover, these effects of consent should rival or exceed those of the
structural variables. On the other hand if, as organizational behaviorists believe, management can
tweak administrative procedures and work structures to improve worker perceptions and
attitudes, then consent will have weaker or non-significant results compared to structural
characteristics of organizations.
The second stage of our analysis articulates the assumption from the disposition research
that there is a single latent factor underlying the measures of the worker’s subjective world.
Disposition theory would argue that this latent factor should be relatively uninfluenced by the
situational factors specified in the model. We test this by specifying workers’ subjective response
using a second order measurement model, constructing it as a scalar variable, and estimating the
relative effects of consent and the structural factors on it using the same model as for the ten
original measures of subjective experience. For organizational behavior theory to be supported,
structural factors must exert the strongest effect on workers’ subjective response; however, if
consent exerts the dominant effect on subjective experience, consent theory is supported. On the
other hand, if none of the measures in the model exert a strong effect on the overall subjective
response, both situational approaches – organizational behavior and informal organization – will
be discredited as key factors influencing workers’ subjective experiences, leaving disposition
theory as the most viable explanation.
13
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Our analysis follows the generalized workplace model portrayed in Figure 1. This model
displays the key independent variables organized under individual characteristics, organizational
characteristics, formal structural position and job characteristics, and informal position (i.e., the
consent deal). The ten variables that measure different dimensions of the subjective experience
of the workplace are shown as outcomes.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
METHODS AND DATA
In this analysis, we utilize the Indiana Quality of Employment Survey (IQES), which was
conducted in the summer of 1996 using the facilities of the Center for Survey Research at the
Indiana University Institute for Social Research Survey (see Wallace et al.1996). The IQES
resulted in 705 respondents (84 percent response rate) from across Indiana selected randomly
from working adults (defined as people over 18 working more than 20 hours per week)
employed in non-agricultural jobs. In households where more than one member met the
requirements of the sampling frame, a computer algorithm randomly selected the respondent
who was interviewed. The survey instrument covered a broad spectrum of quality of employment
issues and developed several scales with acceptable reliability levels (i.e., most scales used
between three to five items). All measures used in the analysis (both individual items and scales)
are shown in the Appendix.
The analysis for this paper was restricted to workers in organizations with 10 or more
employees. Smaller organizations tend to be characterized by simpler management structures,
higher face-to-face interaction, and bonds of loyalty that mitigate formal organization. We
suspect that larger organizations, because of their size and complexity, are fertile ground for the
intermingling of formal and informal organization. This restriction reduced the possible sample
14
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from the IQES to 582 respondents, but this number was further reduced in individual models
because of missing data on some of the variables.
Dependent Variables
We derived ten variables to measure diverse dimensions of the subjective experience of
the workplace. These are meaningful work (the reverse of Blauner’s [1964] concept of
meaninglessness), satisfaction with job security, satisfaction with technology, relations with
supervisors, relations with coworkers, promotion equity, pay equity, perceived discrimination,
and self-estrangement (another dimension of alienation discussed by Blauner [1964]).
Measuring Consent
Following Laubach (2005), we model consent as a second order latent factor 6 comprised
of four latent factors representing commonly discussed attributes of work: autonomy, voice in
decision-making, schedule flexibility, and organizational commitment. We acknowledge that this
formulation combines variables generally used at different levels of workplace models (i.e., three
job characteristics that are often modeled as determinants of organizational commitment) but
offer two arguments for this strategy beyond Laubach’s ethnography. First, even some of the
early proponents of structural analysis recognized the subjective nature of the job characteristics
as outcomes of power struggles (Kalleberg et al. 1981). Second, we argue that the three job
characteristics, as measured in surveys of workers, are in fact subjective interpretations, and
could easily measure a secretary’s level of autonomy as being as high as a manager’s.

6

A second order latent factor model is derived from two or more first order latent factors

instead of the distinctive items that comprise the first order factors.
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Researchers have generally accepted these as objective measures since Hackman and Lawler
(1971) demonstrated high correlations between worker and manager ratings of job
characteristics, but Laubach argued that as subjective measures they are susceptible to consent
and should therefore be modeled as indicators or measures of the underlying “consent deal” – a
relationship expressed by the measurement model depicted with parameter estimates in Figure 2.
We follow Laubach in arguing that this configuration resolves the problem of predicting
subjective responses with a variable constructed using subjective responses—i.e., the real causal
factor is the worker’s position in the informal structure, which is measured by the elements of the
consent deal. 7
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
We used maximum likelihood estimation (see Bollen 1989) but verified the results with
asymptotically distribution free estimators to ensure that there were no distribution problems
caused by using categorical variables. The fit statistics supported the assertion that the revised
model fits the data (χ2=30.6, df=24, p=0.17). We finally constructed an additive scale from these
using the path values from the latent factor model. The Heise and Bohrnstedt (1970) invalidity
statistic (Ψ=.01) verifies that there is only one factor, their validity statistic (ρTS=.85) shows a

7

The survey we use for this study is the “Indiana Quality of Employment Survey” and

almost all the questions we use are derived from the nationally-based Quality of Employment
Survey in the 1970s and have been widely used in other surveys. Thus, the conceptual
distinctiveness of most of the scales is well-established in previous research. In exploratory
factor analyses, we confirmed that the subjective scales were distinctive from each other and
distinctive from the consent deal scale.
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high correlation between the scale and the underlying factor, supporting our use of the composite
scale. Cronbach’s coefficient (α=.75) indicates that this is a reliable measure for consent.
Other Independent Variables
The model controls for individual characteristics of the respondent, organizational
characteristics, and formal structural position and job characteristics. Respondent characteristics
consist of age, sex, race, education, and marital status. Organizational characteristics include
employer size, organization scope (a four-point measure indexing local, statewide, national, or
multinational operations), not-for-profit organization (dummy variable), government
organization (dummy variable), and industry concentration based on sales 8 (see Pfeffer and
Salancik [1978]). Job characteristics include the level of technological change, whether the job is
part-time (dummy variable for working less than 35 hours per week), hours at other jobs (a
measure of multiple job holding), hours worked at home, organization tenure, substantive
complexity (a commonly-used measure of job-specific skill), occupational skill (a scale derived
from eight occupational measures from the U.S. Labor Department’s Dictionary of Occupational
Titles and other sources), and union membership. We use a derivative of Wright’s (1978) class
scheme to approximate formal structural position, because it identifies broad structural categories

8

Industry concentration was missing for non-profit organizations. For these organizations,

we assigned the mean value for all for-profit organizations to non-profits. This allows non-profits
to remain in the analysis but effectively exempts these organizations from the analysis of
industry concentration. It also results in a conservative estimate of the effect of industry
concentration in the overall analysis.
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in the organization based on ownership, managerial authority, and job skill. Our measure yields
five class dummy variables (large employers, large managers, small managers, first-line
supervisors, and autonomous workers) that are contrasted with the excluded category of
nonautonomous workers. We report standardized coefficients for each of the class dummy
variables and use sheaf coefficients to measure the overall impact of structural position. The
sheaf coefficient, which was originated by Heise (1972), allows the effects of multiple dummy
variables to be summarized with a single coefficient that approximates a standardized regression
coefficient. Thus, in each of our regression models we derive a sheaf coefficient to represent the
overall effects of Wright’s class structure dummy variables.
ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE VARIABLES
The results of the first part of our analysis are presented in Table 1. The first model
shows that consent has a strong positive effect on whether the respondent considers his or her
work to be meaningful (βconsent=.29). In fact, the effect of consent is the strongest in the model,
nearly one-third larger than the next largest effect, substantive complexity (βsubstantive
complexity=.21).

Individual characteristics such as being female and being older show positive

effects on meaningful work. Working for a global operation, working full time, being new to the
organization, and being in a unionized position are also determinants of perceiving work as
meaningful. As for structural position, large employers respond as finding less meaning in their
work than non-autonomous workers, but the sheaf coefficient for structural position as a whole is
not significant.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
The second model shows only two key determinants of satisfaction with job security,
consent (βconsent=.41) and age (βage=-.13). No other factors are significant at the p<.05 level. In
18
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the third model, consent is again the strongest determinant of satisfaction with technology with a
positive effect (βconsent=.29), barely edging out the second strongest determinant, technological
change (βtechnological change=.27). Substantive complexity is also positively related to satisfaction
with technology and tenure with the organization is negatively related.
In model four, consent (βconsent=.31) has a positive effect on relations with co-workers and
again is the strongest predictor in the model, over twice the magnitude of the next strongest
variable. Women and union membership are positively related to relations with coworkers, and
hours worked at home is negatively related. Among the structural position variables, large
managers display significantly lower levels of coworker relations than non-autonomous workers,
but as in the previous models the sheaf coefficient for class as a whole is not significant.
In the fifth model, consent shows a very strong positive effect on relations with
supervisors (βconsent=.48), almost three times the effect of the next strongest variable. Again,
women and those who work fewer hours at home have better relations with supervisors, as do
workers who have less tenure with the organization and workers whose jobs have higher levels
of substantive complexity. Being a first-line supervisor has a very strong, negative effect on
relations with their managers relative to the relationship that non-autonomous workers have with
them, and structural position as a whole, measured through the sheaf coefficient, is significant.
In model six, consent (βconsent=.59) has a very large positive impact on the perception of
promotion equity, more than five times the effect of age. In this model, first-line supervisors
respond with a lower perception of promotion equity than non-autonomous workers, but
structural position as a whole, measured through the sheaf coefficient, is not significant.
The seventh model shows that consent has a strong positive impact on pay equity
(βconsent=.35), almost three times the magnitude of the next strongest predictor, working in
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government (βgovernment=-.12), and almost four times as great as working for non-profit
organizations (βnot-for-profit=-.09). These results suggest that workers in government and non-profit
corporations have significantly lower perceptions of pay equity than workers in the private
sector. Other significantly positive determinants of pay equity are being white, tenure with the
organization, and union membership.
In model eight, consent has a strong negative effect on perceived discrimination
(βconsent=-.28) suggesting that workers with high levels of consent are protected from
discriminatory treatment in the workplace. Again, consent is the strongest variable in the model,
substantially higher than the sheaf coefficient for structural position (βstructural position=.17), which
is based largely on the fact that small managers and first-line supervisors perceive significantly
larger levels of discrimination than non-autonomous workers. Workers who are racial minorities
and workers who are unmarried report higher levels of perceived discrimination, as do workers
in less competitive industries and respondents who work more hours on other jobs.
In the ninth model, consent has a strong negative effect on job stress (βconsent=-.19),
equivalent in magnitude to the sheaf coefficient for structural position (βstructural position=.19), which
is based on the fact that large managers, small managers, and first-line supervisors all have
significantly higher levels of job stress than non-autonomous workers. Working in jobs with high
levels of substantive complexity increases job stress, evidencing the highest effect of any
variable in the model (βsubstantive complexity=.24). The remaining significant predictor of job stress is
hours worked at home.
Finally, in model ten, consent has a strong negative impact on self-estrangement
(βconsent=-.46), easily dwarfing the effects of the next closest variable. Women have lower levels
of self-estrangement, as do workers with higher education. However, workers whose jobs have
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higher levels of substantive complexity – higher emphasis on training and change – tend to
report higher levels of self-estrangement. Lower managers are significantly more self-estranged
than non-autonomous workers, but the sheaf coefficient for class as a whole is not significant.
Summarizing the effects across the variables that tap the subjective world of the worker,
consent has the strongest effect in nine of the ten models we examined, and shares second in the
tenth (i.e., job stress). Its effects are in the expected direction, with positive effects on
meaningful work, satisfaction with job security and technology, relations with supervisors and
co-workers, promotion and pay equity; and negative effects on perceived discrimination, job
stress, and self-estrangement. Moreover, while organizational, job, and structural position
variables achieve statistical significance sporadically, their effects are not as consistently strong
across the ten outcome variables. Substantive complexity (i.e., job skill) leads the way among
these variables, achieving statistical significance in five of the ten models. It enhances the
perception that the job is meaningful, satisfaction with technology, and relations with
supervisors, but at the expense of making the job more stressful and inducing self-estrangement.
Longer tenure with an organization has a largely negative effect, stifling the sense that the job is
meaningful, reducing satisfaction with technology, and diminishing relations with supervisors,
but with a positive effect on pay equity. Similarly, jobs with more hours worked at home tend to
diminish relations with coworkers and managers, and increase job stress. On the other hand,
union membership enhanced the perception that the job was meaningful, relations with
coworkers, and the perception of pay equity. Factors such as technological change, occupational
skill levels, and even working only on a single job had minor independent effects on the
subjective measures across the board.
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Organizational factors, often theorized to be important in promoting a hegemonic
ideological influence over workers (see Vallas 1991), have relatively limited effects on the
subjective experience of the workplace. Employer size did not affect any subjective measure.
The organizational scope variable, consistent with expectations, showed that working in more
localized settings enhanced the perception that work is meaningful. Working for government and
non-profit corporations reduced the sense of pay equity. Similarly, industry concentration, a
measure indicating a less competitive environment for the organization, only increased the
perception of workplace discrimination.
Finally, while there are occasionally significant effects for some of the structural position
variables (i.e., class), the sheaf coefficient for structural position as a whole achieves significance
in only three of the ten models. Importantly, most of the significant effects of structural position
emanate from lower managers and first-line supervisors, suggesting the importance of
administrative personnel who have direct, day-to-day contact with rank-and-file workers. Hence,
the analyses support our argument that consent has a pervasive effect on workers’ subjective
response that typically equals or exceeds the effect of formal structural variables.
ANALYSIS OF SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE LATENT FACTOR
In the next stage of the analysis, we ask whether there is a single latent factor underlying
the subjective experience of work – that is, whether the subjective world of the worker can be
expressed as a single constellation of measures that unifies diverse dimensions of workers’
subjective experience. We first reversed the key for perceived discrimination, job stress, and selfestrangement to put them in the same direction as the other seven subjective experience variables
in Table 1. Then, we conducted a factor analysis of all ten subjective experience variables (five
scales and five single measures). This factor analysis yielded two factors, one on which all ten
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subjective experience variables loaded and explained 25 percent of the variance, and the other
which explained only three percent of the variance. The first factor had a Cronbach’s alpha of
.75, indicating a robust factor that included all ten subjective experience variables.
Next, we used structural equation modeling to specify subjective response as a second
order latent factor model using the 19 individual items that comprised the 10 subjective
experience variables (see Appendix 1). The first attempt at a second order specification including
all 19 items yielded a model with poor fit statistics (χ2=369, df=147, p<.001) indicating that the
model did not fit the data. While we agree with Bollen and Long (1993) that rejection of models
should not be based exclusively on chi-squared, we nevertheless sought to identify a more
parsimonious model that included theoretically justifiable improvements. Our first attempt at
parsimony combined work is meaningful and the reversed self-estrangement into a first order
factor of integration with work, dropped job stress as more of a physical outcome of work than
an attitude, dropped satisfaction with technology, satisfaction with pay compared to others at
your workplace, and discrimination by race because they seem more closely tied to situations
than to the underlying factor. This dramatically improved the fit of the model (χ2=202, df=84,
p<.001), but was still beyond the chi-squared criteria for acceptance. 9 After a bit more
experimentation, we found that removing two final items – satisfaction with supervisor and
finding coworkers helpful – resulted in a satisfactory fit (χ2=67, df=59, p=.214). The dataspecific model which comprises seven variables and incorporates 13 of the original 19 items is
shown in Figure 3.

9

However, we note that the normed fit indices GFI, AGFI, NFI, IFI and CFI had all

improved over the original model to greater than .9.
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INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
We next performed a factor analysis on this subset of variables and derived four factors
which explained 27 percent, eight percent, five percent and four percent of the variance
respectively. The first factor included all seven remaining subjective experience variables (six
scales and one individual item) and yielded a Cronbach’s alpha=.80, offering a substantial
improvement over the alpha we derived for the original scale (α=.75) and supporting our
assertion that the reduced factor more robustly measures the subjective experience concept.
Using the path values as weights, we found that the Heise and Bohrnstedt (1970) statistics
support the use of an additive scale with an invalidity statistic (Ψ<.01) verifying that there is
only one second order factor, a validity statistic (ρTS=.93) showing a high correlation between
the scale and the underlying factor, and a reliability statistic (Ω= .86) revealing a much higher
reliability than Cronbach’s alpha.
These results support a key expectation of the disposition approach that there is a single
underlying latent factor that taps the subjective world of the worker. The next step is to
determine whether this dispositional variable is determined by either structural variables or
consent. To investigate this, we regressed the new latent factor portrayed in Figure 3 on the same
set of variables as before. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 2. To isolate the effects
of consent on subjective experience, we show two models, first excluding, then including
consent. 10

10

One potential problem with this procedure is the possible reverse causality between one of

the components of the subjective response scale—discrimination—and consent. We contend that
one factor mitigating this argument is that discrimination fits the subjectivity scale so well
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INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
In the first model of Table 2, which excludes consent, we find two significant
determinants of subjective experience – industry concentration, which exerts a negative effect
(βindustrial concentration=-.11) and substantive complexity, which shows a strong positive effect
(βsubstantive complexity=.24). This provides evidence in support of the organizational behavior
argument that structural factors, specifically environmental (i.e., market competition) and
technological (i.e., job-specific skills) dimensions, impact the subjective experience of work.
However, numerous other structural variables in the model are non-significant and the R-squared
is only .14, meaning that dispositional theorists could also claim support for their argument that
the subjective experience of work is largely unaltered by structural variables.
In the second model in Table 2, we test support for the informal organization argument
by adding consent to the model. Here we find that consent is the dominant predictor (βconsent=.64)
of the latent factor of subjective experience, with a greater magnitude than for any of the ten

indicating that it is part of the broader subjective response. We would acknowledge that this
subjective response might be altered to exclude discrimination if, for example, there were a
seismic shift in discriminatory behavior that affected workers on a broad scale (but not a single
incident of discrimination in a single workplace). In a similar manner, other elements might enter
or exit the subjective response scale if there were a dramatic shift in relations with supervisors,
pay equity, or other dimensions that cut across all the workplaces in our sample. One lesson of
this exercise is that we do not claim that the particular configuration of the subjective response
scale in our analysis is fixed or static. Rather, the subjective response scale should be viewed as a
fluid and dynamic concept subject to change over time.
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original subjective experience variables. Industry concentration, which was significant in the
previous model, is now non-significant, and substantive complexity has been greatly reduced
(βsubstantive complexity=.09), indicating that its effects are partly mediated through consent. New
variables that achieve significance are education (βeducation=.10) and the sheaf coefficient for class
which indexes structural position (βstructural position=.16). The latter finding results primarily from
negative effects of first-line supervisors and small managers relative to non-autonomous
workers. Importantly, the R-squared for the model including consent jumps to 45 percent of the
variance, a more than threefold increase over the model that excluded consent (R-squared=.14).
On balance, these results suggest strong support for the informal organization argument and
weak support for organizational behavior arguments, and the evidence for the disposition
argument is mixed given the strong effect of consent on workers’ subjective experience. 11

11

Importantly, the results of the regression model shown in the second model in Table 2 are

not much different from results when we regressed the scale constructed from the mean of the
original items or from the theoretically justified reduced model. In both analyses, we found that
consent was the dominant predictor with significant effects for education, hours worked at home,
and the sheaf coefficient for structural position, all at approximately the same magnitudes. The
R-squared showed that both model explained around 43 percent of the variance, similar to the
model in Table 2. The bottom line is that whether the second order latent variable is derived from
the looser criterion of the mean of all 10 original items or from the stricter criterion provided by
the structural equation models, the results lead us to the same conclusion – that consent is the
major determinant of the worker’s subjective world.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The subjective world of the worker has been a topic of continuing interest in the study of
the workplace. Workplace theorists have generally subscribed to one of three perspectives on
how the subjective experience of work is determined: (1) as a response to structural
characteristics of the organization or job, some of which can be manipulated by management; (2)
as an outcome of the consent deal that arises in the ongoing social construction of informal
relations at the point of production; or (3) as a direct reflection of the general disposition of the
worker, a constellation of attitudes that is relatively impervious to change as a result of
workplace variables. Our research largely rejects the first, provides qualified support for the
third, and strongly endorses the second of these perspectives.
Our results point convincingly to the conclusion that there is a single latent factor
underlying much of the subjective world of the worker and it is primarily determined by consent,
rather than structural factors. Thus, the structural theory – that worker subjectivity is affected by
how a job is structured – finds little support. Counterintuitive as it may be, workers’ subjective
response seems largely unaffected by occupational skills, tenure with the organization, the
opportunity to work at home, or even whether the job is full or part time. The single latent factor
which organizes a diverse range of subjective work experiences might be read as partial support
for disposition theory. However, the central role played by the consent deal in structuring
workers’ subjective response undermines disposition theory and points to the importance of the
informal relations perspective. Workers’ subjective experiences – their underlying perceptions of
fairness, job security, relations with supervisors and co-workers, perceptions of discrimination,
and work integration – are primarily determined by the configuration of perceived autonomy,
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schedule flexibility, voice in decision-making, and organizational commitment that constitutes
the core components of the consent deal.
The centrality of consent follows closely from Burawoy’s (1979) Manufacturing
Consent. Burawoy’s work represents a watershed moment for the sociological study of work in
the contemporary era because, in the face of largely structural arguments about the organization
of the workplace, it pointed instead to the importance of the culture of the shop floor or the
office. Following Burawoy, a largely ethnographic tradition in the study of work has directed
researchers to pay attention to the disconnect that often exists between formal structural
arrangements in the workplace and the informal aspects of organizational life. Two recurring
themes in this research are the wide gap between managerial rhetoric about administrative
practices and organizational reality and the central role of consent in bridging the disconnect
between these two realms of organizational life (cf., Juravich 1985; Grenier 1988; Finlay 1988;
Graham 1995). For example, Vallas’s recent research (2003a; 2003b) highlights the futile efforts
of management to implement structural change in the workplace in the absence of consent, or
what may be called worker resistance (cf., Fantasia 1988; Jermier et al.1994; Roscigno and
Hodson 2004). Vallas concludes that managerial implementation of several “teamwork”
initiatives in four paper processing plants occasionally resulted in worker integration and
achieved limited success. But more typically these programs failed because they relied too
heavily on scientific and technical rationality and neglected to address the underlying normative
processes which might have provided a moral foundation for more progressive workplace
change. In short, the workers recognized the top-down initiatives of management for what they
were, schemes for more effective control of workers in the hopes of eliciting higher rates of
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productivity, and largely withheld their consent or actively resisted them. Somewhere, Mayo’s
critics smiled.
Our research builds upon the lessons learned from previous ethnographic research. Using
a representative sample of workers from a wide cross-section of occupations, industries, and
organizations in Indiana, we derive a quantitative measure of consent and demonstrate its utility
in explaining a wide array of subjective experiences in the generalized workplace. Our research
thus provides strong evidence for the claim that the dynamics of informal organization and
consent, so richly illustrated in previous ethnographic studies, are a central force in the
structuring of workers’ subjective experiences. So far as we know, our research is the first effort
to explore quantitatively the importance of consent in shaping workers’ subjective experiences
using a broad, representative sample of workers. We encourage other researchers not only to
replicate our analyses with other quantitative data sets but also to develop longitudinal studies of
these phenomena to better identify the temporal processes involved.. In this way, we can better
establish the generalizability of results about the workers’ subjective world provided through
ethnographic studies.
Our results should not be read as a claim that consent is the only salient feature of the
informal organization. Other informal networks such as friendship or ethnic networks or even
sport betting pools can certainly be consequential in the workplace and the interconnections
among these various aspects of informal organization are worth exploring. Indeed, we view it as
part of a broader research agenda to examine the interplay among consent and other features of
informal organization, as well as to identify how these different aspects of informal organization
affect both subjective experiences and objective work outcomes like income, job tenure, and
mobility.
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From a theoretical perspective, these results are far-reaching. The relative impotence of
structural variables in explaining workers’ subjective experiences was frankly surprising to us
given the longstanding tradition of research pointing to the centrality of technology (e.g., Perrow
1967; Blauner 1964; Braverman 1974; Zuboff 1988) and other organizational factors (see Burns
and Stalker 1961; Thompson 1967; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990) in
shaping worker attitudes. We are leery of drawing conclusions that summarily dismiss structural
explanations and feel that a fuller array of structural variables than are available from the IQES
might well have shown stronger results. Nevertheless, we believe our results give new urgency to
the study of informal organization and its effects, particularly in broader empirical settings as
represented by surveys and using quantitative analytical methods. Further, we have demonstrated
that worker agency, that is, the capacity of workers to actively negotiate, manipulate, and change
workplace rules, is at least as important as managers’ capacity to promulgate workplace
structures that elicit higher worker productivity.
From a practical perspective, our results should not be read to suggest that managers
should stop structuring the workplace to improve conditions for workers. Instead, the strongest
“recommendation” that flows from our research is that workers are most integrated when they
are equal partners with management in the formulation of workplace policies and, as co-equals,
consent to the enterprise. Managers should also recognize that the strongest influence on worker
subjectivity comes from their relations with their immediate supervisors. However,
management’s strongest “tool” with which to influence workers – supervisors – are themselves
conflicted in their relations with their supervisors, their sense of promotion equity, perceived
discrimination, stress, and most importantly, the underlying subjective factor.
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This study demonstrates the power of our measure of consent in statistical studies of the
generalized workplace. Since it is constructed from fairly standard workplace measures, further
studies should examine past data sets to explore how levels of consent and its effects have
changed over time. More importantly, as a measure of worker subjectivity, analyses
incorporating consent offer an opportunity to explore more fully how workplace subjectivity
affects subjective responses to other arenas of modern social life.
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Appendix A. Definitions of Variables
Standard responses are 1=strongly agree, 2=somewhat agree, 3=somewhat disagree, and
4=strongly disagree, with “neither agree nor disagree” not prompted. These are recoded to reflect
higher levels of agreement, with “neither agree nor disagree” coded at 2.5. Means, standard
deviations, alphas are computed for organizations with more than 10 employees and no missing
values for consent scale.
Mean
Consent
(stdev)
Autonomy
Agreement with statements (standard responses):
idecide: It is basically my own responsibility to decide how my
job gets done.

3.38
(0.85)

lotofsay: I have a lot of say about what happens on my job.

2.91
(0.91)
3.16
(0.93)

freedom: My job gives me a lot of freedom about how I do my
work [this was dropped from full consent model]
Computed as mean score. Reliability α =.66
Schedule
flexibility

3.15
(0.69)

Please tell me how much say you have in the following areas
(1=a lot of say, 2=some say, 3=none at all; reflected for higher
values to indicate greater say):
sayhours: The number of hours you work
saydays: The days of the week you work.
saytime: The time of day you work.
Computed as mean score. (Each item was adjusted such that
1=1, 2=3, and 3=5) Reliability α=.79

Voice in
Agreement with statements (standard responses):
decision-making partdecs: My job does not allow me to participate in important
decisions that affect my organization. (Not reflected so higher
values indicate greater participation)
Organizational
Agreement with statements (standard responses):
commitment
workhard: I am willing to work harder than I have to help my

1.91
(0.76)
1.80
(0.82)
1.83
(0.76)
1.85
(0.66)
2.65
(1.03)

employer succeed

3.48
(0.70)

myvalues: I find that my values and my employer's values are
very similar

2.93
(0.99)

iamproud: I am proud to be working for my employer

3.34
(0.80)
3.25
(0.66)

Computed as mean score. Reliability α=.70
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Individual Characteristics
Gender

Dichotomous variable (Female=1)

0.47
(0.5)

Race

Computed as a dichotomous variable (white=1) from a question
that offered a selection of racial groupings. The sample was
89.3% white.

0.88
(0.33)

Age

Computed from year of birth.

39.14
(11.8)

Education

Asked as highest grade of school or level of education and
grouped by attainment (1=high school, 2=some college,
3=college degree and graduate work)

13.70
(2.27)

Marital status

Computed as a dichotomous variable (married=1) from a
question that included living with a partner, widowed, divorced,
separated, and never married.

0.60
(0.49)

Organizational Characteristics
Employer size

How many people work for your employer at all locations? (1=1
through 9, 2=10 through 49, 3=50 through 99, 4=100 through
499, 5=500 through 999, 6=1000 through 1999, and 7=2000+)

5.12
(1.94)

Note: Respondents were asked directly, but these categories
were offered if respondents did not provide an estimate. This
study recoded responses into categories. In 12% of the cases the
survey staff obtained organization size through outside sources.
Computed into local, statewide, national, and multinational as
the highest level using the following questions:
Does the company (organization) you work for have more than 1
location in Indiana?

2.65
(1.10)

Does your company (organization) have locations in other
states?

.63
(.48)

Does your company (organization) have locations outside the
United States?

.33
(.47)

Not-for-profit

Recoded as a dichotomous variable from: In your present job do
you work for the government, a private company, a not-for-profit
organization, or are you self-employed? (Not-for-profit=1)

0.09
(0.28)

Government

Recoded as a dichotomous variable from In your present job do
you work for the government, a private company, a not-for-profit
organization, or are you self-employed? (Government=1)

0.17
(0.38)

Industry
concentration

Respondents were asked what kind of business or industry they
worked for, with a follow up question asking what product or

50.66
(28.03)

Organization
scope
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by sales

service the company provided. These were coded to the 1990
Industrial Classification System using the Alphabetical Index of
Industries and Occupations, published by the U.S. Department
of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Industry environmental
data such as the concentration ratio in corporate sales were
appended by industry code based on data obtained from the IRS
Sourcebook: Statistics of Income, 1993. Corporate Income Tax
Returns. Missing values (i.e. from government organizations)
were recoded to the sample mean to ensure that the cases are not
excluded from the overall analysis but do not contribute to the
analysis of this factor.

Job Characteristics
Technological
change

Since you began your present job, how much change has there
been in the technology you use on your job? (1=very much,
2=some, 3=not very much)

3.01
(0.89)

An additional volunteered category of “none” was added and
responses were reflected to increase with increasing change.
Part-time work

Computed from On average, how many hours per week do you
work? (1=less than 35 hours)

.10
(.29)

Hours at other
jobs

On average, about how many hours per week do you work in all
other jobs outside of your main job?

2.06
(6.93)

Hours worked at On average, about how many hours per week, if any, do you
home
work at home doing things for your job?

2.51
(5.53)

Tenure with
organization

For about how long have you worked for your present
employer? Coded as years.

7.73
(9.09)

Substantive
complexity

Computed from the following

Occupational
skill

learnjob: How long does it take to learn the key aspects of your
job? (1=a few hours, 2=a day, 3=a few days to a week,
4=several weeks, 5=2 to 5 months, 6=6 months to a year, 7=a
few years, 8=5 years or more)

4.95
(1.98)

hiskill: My job requires a high level of skill. (Standard agreement
responses)

3.20
(0.85)

learning: I am constantly learning now things on my job.
(Standard agreement responses)

3.18
(0.94)

Computed as mean score (learnjob/2, hiskill, and learning).
Reliability α=.66

2.95
(0.72)

Respondents were asked their job title what they did on their job.
These responses were coded using the 1990 Dictionary of
Occupational Titles published by the U.S. Department of Labor,
Employment and Training Administration. These titles are
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assigned ratings of various work functions based on studies
conducted or funded by various branches of the government.
This measure captures occupational skill as the mean of Z-scores
for 8 occupational measures from DOT and other sources.
SEIM

Socioeconomic Index based upon males only

Data score

Represents the degree to which the occupation requires functions
with regards to data.

People score

Represents the degree to which the occupation requires functions
with regards to people.

GED
reasoning
score

General Education Development Scale for Reasoning
Development required for the occupation.

GED math
score

General Education Development Scale for Mathematical
Development required by the occupation.

SVP

Specific Vocational Preparation measure represents the amount
of time required by a typical worker to learn what is necessary to
adequately perform the job. The training may be acquired in
school, work, military, institutional, or vocational settings.

Average
education

average number of years of education of workers in the 1990
Census occupation category in 1995. Based upon data extracted
from the Current Population Survey, 1995.

Percent
college
graduates

percentage of workers having college degrees in the 1990
Census occupation category in 1995. Based upon data extracted
from the Current Population Survey, 1995.

Union
membership

Do you currently belong to a union? (Union=1)

0.18
(0.39)

Formal Organizational Position
Based on Erik Wright’s (1978) model of social class including “contradictory
locations” based in ownership, supervision, and skills.
Employer size
See above
Organization
type

5.09
(1.94)

In your present job do you work for the government, a private
company, a not-for-profit organization, or are you selfemployed?
2.3%

self-employed
Is a supervisor

In your job, do you supervise the work of other employees?
(Supervisor =1)

Number

How many people do you supervise directly or indirectly?
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supervised

5 or fewer employees

24.9%

6-20 employees

16.7%
8.0%

More than 20 employees
Skilled
occupation

Respondents were asked their job title and normal duties, which
were then coded into DOT Occupational Codes. For distribution
by occupational groups, see Table 4b. Occupational averages
were obtained for eight skill related measures (SEI, DOT data
and people scores, average GED reasoning and math scores,
specific vocational preparation, average education for
occupation, and percent of occupation with college degree).
These were computed as z-scores and averaged into a skill scale,
which was recoded into a dichotomous variable for high (scale >
0) and low (scale<0) skilled worker.

36.1%

Formal
organization
position

1. Non-Autonomous Worker – not self-employed, nonsupervisory, does not work in a “skilled” occupation

37.2%

2. First-Line Supervisor – not self-employed and supervises 5
or less workers

14.2%

3. Semi-Autonomous Worker – not self-employed, nonsupervisory or supervises 5 or fewer people, works in a
“skilled” occupation

23.0%

4. Lower Manager – not self-employed and supervises between
6 and 20 people

15.7%

5. Upper/Middle Manager – not self-employed and supervises
more than 20 people

7.6%

6. Large Employer/Capitalist – self-employed and employs 10
or more workers

2.3%

Subjective Experience
Job is
meaningful

Agreement with statement (standard responses):
meaningl: I sometimes feel that the work I do is meaningless.

3.98
(1.43)

(Not reflected for higher values to indicate greater meaning)
Satisfaction
with job
security

Uses standard satisfaction responses (1=not at all satisfied, 2=not
too satisfied, 3=somewhat satisfied, 4=very satisfied, and
5=completely satisfied):

3.29
(.85)

satsecur: How satisfied are you with your level of job security?
Satisfaction
with technology

Uses standard satisfaction responses:
sattech: How satisfied are you with the technology you use on
your job?
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Supervisor
relations

Agreement with statements (standard responses):
suprhelp: My supervisor is helpful to me in getting my job done.
suprcomp: My supervisor is competent in doing his or her job.
satsuper: How satisfied are you with your supervisors? (Uses
standard satisfaction responses)
Computed as mean score. Reliability α=.82

Coworker
relations

cowohelp: My coworker is helpful to me in getting my job done.

satcowor: How satisfied are you with your coworkers? (Uses
standard satisfaction responses)
Computed as mean score. Reliability α=.82

Pay equity

Discrimination
at work

3.26
(0.76)

Agreement with statements (standard responses):

cowocomp: My coworker is competent in doing his or her job.

Promotion
equity

4.00
(1.28)
4.23
(1.17)
4.14
(1.13)

4.21
(1.03)
4.26
(0.93)
4.27
(0.95)
3.35
(0.56)

Agreement with statements (standard responses):
getahead: My employer wants to give everyone a chance to get
ahead.

3.61
(1.39)

promfair: Promotions are handled fairly at my workplace.

3.42
(1.44)

Reliability α=.78

2.84
(0.90)

Uses standard satisfaction responses:
fairpay: On the whole, how satisfied are you that you are fairly
paid for the skills that you have to offer your employer?

3.67
(1.31)

payyempl: How satisfied are you with your pay compared to
others at your workplace?

4.00
(1.19)

payoempl: How satisfied are you with your pay compared to
people who do work similar to yours for other employers?

3.61
(1.41)

Computed as mean score. Reliability α=.83

3.00
(0/81)

Uses the responses 1=never, 2=seldom, 3=sometimes, 4=often:
discsex: How often, if at all, do you feel discriminated against at
your job because of your sex?

1.61
(1.13)

discrace: How often, if at all, do you feel discriminated against
at your job because of your race or national origin?

1.34
(0.93)

discage: How often, if at all, do you feel discriminated against at

1.50
(1.08)
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your job because of your age?
Computed as mean score. Reliability α=.51

1.37
(0.55)

Job stress

On a day-to-day basis, how stressful is your job? (1=never
stressful, 2=seldom stressful, 3=sometimes stressful, 4=often
stressful, 5=always stressful)

3.48
(0/89)

Selfestrangement

Agreement with statement (standard responses):

1.97
(1.03)

judgment: Some of the things I have to do on my job go against
my better judgment.
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Figure 1. Generalized Workplace Model
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Figure 2. Measurement Model for Consent
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Figure 3. Measurement Model for Subjective Response: The Subjective World of
the Worker
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Table 1 Panel A. OLS Regressions of Job Attitudes, Perceptions, Behaviors, and Rewards on
Individual, Organizational, and Formal and Informal Position Characteristics.
Satisfaction Satisfaction
Relations
Job is
with Job
with
with
Meaningful
Security
Technology Coworkers
Full Models
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
individual characteristics
Gender (female=1)
.10 *
.03
.03
.13 **
Race (white=1)
-.05
.05
.06
.00
Age (by category)
.14 **
-.13 **
.07
-.03
Education (by achievement)
.09
.01
-.02
.04
Marital status (married=1)
.00
-.05
.02
.02
Organizational characteristics
Employer size (by category)
.07
-.06
.01
.04
Organization Scope
-.12 *
-.06
.02
-.02
Not-for-profit (=1)
-.03
-.02
-.01
-.06
Government (=1)
-.09
.08
.01
-.02
Industry concentration
-.02
-.08
-.03
-.01
Job characteristics
Technological change
.05
-.02
.27 **
.03
Part-time work
-.09 *
-.05
-.03
.05
Hours at other jobs
.02
-.07
.02
.01
Hours worked at home
.02
-.01
-.02
-.13 **
Tenure with organization
-.14 **
.05
-.17 **
-.06
Substantive complexity
.21 **
.02
.15 **
.08
Occupational skill (a)
.00
-.12
-.11
.08
Union Membership
.09 *
-.02
.00
.14 **
Structural position: Wright's class
Class: Large Employer (=1)
-.10 *
-.04
-.05
.00
Class: Large Manager (=1)
-.02
.04
-.08
-.10 *
Class: Small Manager (=1)
-.09
.03
.00
-.09
Class: First Line Supervisor (=1)
-.08
.06
-.03
-.07
Class: Autonomous Worker (=1)
-.07
.09
.03
-.03
Class Sheaf Coefficient
.10
.10
.10
.12
Informal position
Consent
.29 **
.41 **
.29 **
.31 **

R-squared
.22
.20
N
537
536
Notes: coefficients are standardized
* p<.05
** p<.01 two tailed test
(a) from Dictionary of Occupational Titles (US Department of Labor)
(b) the reference category for class is non-autonomous workers.
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Table 1 Panel B. OLS Regressions of Job Attitudes, Perceptions, Behaviors, and Rewards on
Individual, Organizational, and Formal and Informal Position Characteristics.
Relations
Perceived
with
Promotion
Pay
DiscrimSupervisors
Equity
Equity
ination
Full Models
Model 5
Model 6
Model 7
Model 8
individual characteristics
Gender (female=1)
.10 *
.03
-.02
.08
Race (white=1)
-.02
-.01
.10 *
-.13 **
Age (by category)
-.03
-.11 *
-.04
-.01
Education (by achievement)
.00
.04
.05
-.06
Marital status (married=1)
.01
-.02
-.02
-.10 *
Organizational characteristics
Employer size (by category)
-.01
.01
.09
.00
Organization Scope
-.02
-.03
.02
.05
Not-for-profit (=1)
.01
.03
-.09 *
-.03
Government (=1)
.06
-.01
-.12 *
.02
Industry concentration
-.01
-.05
-.05
.10 *
Job characteristics
Technological change
.00
-.04
.00
.03
Part-time work
-.06
-.03
-.03
.05
Hours at other jobs
-.07
.04
.03
.09 *
Hours worked at home
-.08 *
-.05
-.05
.03
Tenure with organization
-.15 **
-.04
.11 *
.04
Substantive complexity
.13 *
.07
.01
.03
Occupational skill (a)
-.06
-.04
-.08
.00
Union Membership
.04
-.02
.10 *
.07
Structural position: Wright's class
Class: Large Employer (=1)
.00
-.07
.06
.03
Class: Large Manager (=1)
-.05
.02
.07
.03
Class: Small Manager (=1)
-.06
-.05
.02
.11 *
Class: First Line Supervisor (=1)
-.17 **
-.15 **
-.02
.18 **
Class: Autonomous Worker (=1)
-.10
-.01
.06
.04
Class Sheaf Coefficient
.16 *
.16
.11
.17 *
Informal position
Consent
.48 **
.59 **
.35 **
-.28 **

R-squared
.28
.38
.20
N
505
536
536
Notes: coefficients are standardized
* p<.05
** p<.01 two tailed test
(a) from Dictionary of Occupational Titles (US Department of Labor)
(b) the reference category for class is non-autonomous workers.
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Table 1 Panel C. OLS Regressions of Job Attitudes, Perceptions, Behaviors,
and Rewards on Individual, Organizational, and Formal and Informal
Position Characteristics.
Self
Job
EstrangeStress
ment
Full Models
Model 9
Model 10
individual characteristics
Gender (female=1)
.07
-.14 **
Race (white=1)
.01
.04
Age (by category)
.04
.04
Education (by achievement)
-.09
-.13 **
Marital status (married=1)
-.01
-.04
Organizational characteristics
Employer size (by category)
.03
-.04
Organization Scope
-.02
.07
Not-for-profit (=1)
.07
-.02
Government (=1)
-.01
.01
Industry concentration
.01
-.04
Job characteristics
Technological change
.06
-.03
Part-time work
.00
-.01
Hours at other jobs
.07
.03
Hours worked at home
.11 *
.07
Tenure with organization
-.04
-.05
Substantive complexity
.24 **
.12 *
Occupational skill (a)
.10
-.01
Union Membership
.01
.00
Structural position: Wright's class
Class: Large Employer (=1)
.00
-.03
Class: Large Manager (=1)
.13 *
-.01
Class: Small Manager (=1)
.13 **
.10 *
Class: First Line Supervisor (=1)
.11 *
.05
Class: Autonomous Worker (=1)
-.04
.01
Class Sheaf Coefficient
.19 **
.10
Informal position
Consent
-.19 **
-.46 **

R-squared
.16
.23
N
537
535
Notes: coefficients are standardized
* p<.05
** p<.01 two tailed test
(a) from Dictionary of Occupational Titles (US Department of Labor)
(b) the reference category for class is non-autonomous workers.
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Table 2. OLS Regressions of Subjective Response on Individual,
Organizational, and Formal and Informal Position Characteristics.
Subjective
Response
Full Models
Model 1
Model 2
Individual characteristics
Gender (female=1)
-.01
.03
Race (white=1)
.00
.00
Age (by category)
-.07
-.07
Education (by achievement)
.10
.10 *
Marital status (married=1)
.01
.02
Organizational characteristics
Employer size (by category)
.04
.03
Organization Scope
-.05
-.05
Not-for-profit (=1)
.05
.00
Government (=1)
-.08
-.05
Industry concentration
-.11 *
-.06
Job characteristics
Technological change
.01
-.02
Part-time work
-.07
-.06
Hours at other jobs
-.06
-.04
Hours worked at home
-.07
-.08
Tenure with organization
-.06
-.05
Substantive complexity
.24 **
.09 *
Occupational skill (a)
.01
-.08
Union Membership
-.04
.04
Structural position: Wright's class
Class: Large Employer (=1)
.00
-.03
Class: Large Manager (=1)
.06
-.02
Class: Small Manager (=1)
.00
-.09 *
Class: First Line Supervisor (=1)
-.10
-.17 **
Class: Autonomous Worker (=1)
-.09
-.03
Class Sheaf Coefficient
.14
.16 **
Informal position
Consent
.64 **

R-squared
.14
.45
N
463
463
Notes: coefficients are standardized
* p<.05
** p<.01 two tailed test
(a) from Dictionary of Occupational Titles (US Department of Labor)
(b) the reference category for class is non-autonomous workers.
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